On the basis of their being conscious feeling thinking emotional beings I assert that there is no moral difference between violating the bodily autonomy of a non-human animal and a human. Given a no alternative hypothetical it’s fair to give preference for who to spare, but this is not the same as willful unnecessary violence and killing.
If it’s false equivalency, demonstrate why it is permissible to kill non humans but not even permissible to punch humans in the face. What is the morally relevant difference? If you could apply that difference to a human, would you then justify doing to them all the things we do to animals?
Insofar as our laws view animals, we do not afford them the same considerations or rights as we do our own species. I can’t speak for Europe, but in the legal systems of North American countries, animals are granted their own distinct protections separate from the protections given to entities with the designation of personhood (i.e. humans or service animals).
For instance, with permits and barring species that are protected for conservation reasons, humans are allowed to hunt and kill animals for both sport and sustenance. In such cases, animals do not consent to their hunting.
However, that does not mean that it is okay to hurt animals without cause. There are animal cruelty laws that cover unjustified and inhumane treatment of wild and pet animals.
If it is legal to kill animals but illegal to be “cruel” to them, then the act of killing an animal is not, in itself, cruelty. If it was, then animal cruelty would unconditionally occur during the process of hunting, making the latter illegal.
With these four points, and keeping in mind that laws are a reflection of the collective beliefs of society, we see that:
Harming humans is viewed as a different act than harming animals, and is not generally permissible.
Killing animals is permissible.
Inflicting intentional cruelty on animals is not permissible.
(2) is not precluded by (3).
By (1) and that punching a human in the face is an act of harming them (and also illegal), I conclude that it is not morally permissible to punch humans in the face.
By (2) and (4), I conclude that it is morally permissible to kill non-human animals.
Just in case anyone thinks relativism is a cop-out answer because laws were written in the past and may not be reflective of society’s current moral views, I ask you to consider this:
Laws are constantly changed to align with updated beliefs. Canada amended its laws to consider gender identity a protected class, which reflects the contemporary belief that transgender individuals deserve equality and freedom from being discriminated against. If society cared about not killing animals, hunting for sport would be unconditionally outlawed.
Edit 1: I meant cultural relativism. Non-Western cultures have different (and in some cases, more progressive) views on animal rights.
Foundationally we already disagree, as I’m a moral objectivist. To assert moral subjectivity is to assert that moral progress does not exist. But with your edit your argument is actually now even worse IMO, because instead of focusing on a moral relativist position you’re now basically saying morality=culture/law. i.e., since you have no say in what another society does without disrupting their agreed practice, all their actions are permissible. Bigotry is permissible. Slavery is permissible, hangings are permissible, genocide is permissible, etc, just so long as it simultaneously does not occur within proximity to you and rejects your preference. I think you are tolerant of intolerance.
Moral objectivism is pretty much the argument that inevitably always ends with an authoritarian regime to “eliminate” the “unethical” people from society. Germany first, and all that.
So if i want an external society to stop genociding for abritrary reasons, and I encourage my society to openly condemn it – even consider physical intervention where no alternative works, I’m the nazi? Did America do a nazi when they invaded Germany to end Hitler’s expansion/regime?
I don’t think we’re coming to any sort of agreement here.
You believe there’s a universal set of morals, and I believe individuals’ morals are determined by environment (time, place, morals of others around the individual, etc.) and ultimately come together to form a collective understanding of morality for that point in time and those within that cultural environment.
That aside, concluding that I’m “tolerant of intolerance” is both disingenuous and incorrect. I believe that culture dictates morality, and I respect that other cultures are allowed to have their beliefs, but that doesn’t mean I choose to agree with them. I don’t consider any of your examples permissible under my own moral code.
I also accept that I am not the universal standard, and that it would be hypocritical to impose my own beliefs on demographics with a different moral code. To override the moral autonomy of others1 in a crusade for moral righteousness would be an unjust act in itself. Or in layman’s idiom, “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.”
1 Others, plural. Not individuals who are exceptional to the moral concensus of their surroundings (i.e. murderers)
I believe we seek to arrive at universal morals. When we discuss atrocities, I don’t see any reason to frame concerns for the well-being of others as personal preference. Their well-being is outside myself. The concern is for their own sake, not mine. I think you’re in contradiction because you are once again saying you don’t get to override the moral autonomy of others but simultaneously concede that you oppose atrocities that the moral autonomy of others permit. If I had the option to stop another society (where the majority of that society are in agreement on the action) from engaging in arbitrary genocide of their own citizens, I’d do that. The idea that you would find my action to stop them less permissible than their own tells me you lack conviction for your own values.
Correct. I, and nobody else, should be permitted to override the moral autonomy of others. Atrocities have already been performed under the line of reasoning that the persecutors’ beliefs are objectivity superior to those that they are persecuting, and this is not something that we should aspire to repeat in the current day. Two moral wrongs—persecuting those that are persecuting others—does not make a moral right.
If the goal in your hypothetical scenario were solely to provide refuge and safe haven for willing members of said society, then I would have no problem with that. You would not be overriding moral beliefs; refugees would simply be voluntarily defecting from their own.
If your goal is to stop the genocide by destabilizing the society and installing your own set of moral beliefs in its place, then it would no longer be permissible.
Well homie I appreciate the bullet bite but I don’t know how to fix you - you not only feel no need to endorse the ending of genocide - even for the marginalized in societies outside your own, you actively discourage and look down upon interfering with genocide. I don’t know if you have the capacity to engage as a member of society, and frankly you may be a danger to it. Maybe you get the boot out of Athens 😵💫
We can agree to disagree on our differing views of morality, I guess.
With regards to genocide, it’s a tough topic. We both agree that it’s wrong, but we don’t agree on how to approach it. I come from the perspective that there isn’t a baseline for morality and that it’s amoral to foist a subjective standard on others. You come from the perspective that there exists a universal standard for morality, and that it is amoral to allow societies to deviate from it.
Two diametrically opposed viewpoints that can’t be reconciled at this point in time. Maybe, in the future, if we have a unified global “culture” and moral relativism and cultural relativism are indistinguishable, we might be able to come to some agreement. Until then, you do you, and I do me.
On the basis of their being conscious feeling thinking emotional beings I assert that there is no moral difference between violating the bodily autonomy of a non-human animal and a human. Given a no alternative hypothetical it’s fair to give preference for who to spare, but this is not the same as willful unnecessary violence and killing.
If it’s false equivalency, demonstrate why it is permissible to kill non humans but not even permissible to punch humans in the face. What is the morally relevant difference? If you could apply that difference to a human, would you then justify doing to them all the things we do to animals?
Your examples don’t have victims, this one does.
See but you’re assuming that we agree to your axiomatic premise that there is no moral difference between the two.
We reject your premise. Prove there’s no difference.
You don’t think animals are conscious? Or do you not care that they are conscious?
From the perspective of cultural relativism.*
Insofar as our laws view animals, we do not afford them the same considerations or rights as we do our own species. I can’t speak for Europe, but in the legal systems of North American countries, animals are granted their own distinct protections separate from the protections given to entities with the designation of personhood (i.e. humans or service animals).
For instance, with permits and barring species that are protected for conservation reasons, humans are allowed to hunt and kill animals for both sport and sustenance. In such cases, animals do not consent to their hunting.
However, that does not mean that it is okay to hurt animals without cause. There are animal cruelty laws that cover unjustified and inhumane treatment of wild and pet animals.
If it is legal to kill animals but illegal to be “cruel” to them, then the act of killing an animal is not, in itself, cruelty. If it was, then animal cruelty would unconditionally occur during the process of hunting, making the latter illegal.
With these four points, and keeping in mind that laws are a reflection of the collective beliefs of society, we see that:
By (1) and that punching a human in the face is an act of harming them (and also illegal), I conclude that it is not morally permissible to punch humans in the face.
By (2) and (4), I conclude that it is morally permissible to kill non-human animals.
Just in case anyone thinks relativism is a cop-out answer because laws were written in the past and may not be reflective of society’s current moral views, I ask you to consider this:
Laws are constantly changed to align with updated beliefs. Canada amended its laws to consider gender identity a protected class, which reflects the contemporary belief that transgender individuals deserve equality and freedom from being discriminated against. If society cared about not killing animals, hunting for sport would be unconditionally outlawed.
Edit 1: I meant cultural relativism. Non-Western cultures have different (and in some cases, more progressive) views on animal rights.
Foundationally we already disagree, as I’m a moral objectivist. To assert moral subjectivity is to assert that moral progress does not exist. But with your edit your argument is actually now even worse IMO, because instead of focusing on a moral relativist position you’re now basically saying morality=culture/law. i.e., since you have no say in what another society does without disrupting their agreed practice, all their actions are permissible. Bigotry is permissible. Slavery is permissible, hangings are permissible, genocide is permissible, etc, just so long as it simultaneously does not occur within proximity to you and rejects your preference. I think you are tolerant of intolerance.
Moral objectivism is pretty much the argument that inevitably always ends with an authoritarian regime to “eliminate” the “unethical” people from society. Germany first, and all that.
So if i want an external society to stop genociding for abritrary reasons, and I encourage my society to openly condemn it – even consider physical intervention where no alternative works, I’m the nazi? Did America do a nazi when they invaded Germany to end Hitler’s expansion/regime?
I don’t think we’re coming to any sort of agreement here.
You believe there’s a universal set of morals, and I believe individuals’ morals are determined by environment (time, place, morals of others around the individual, etc.) and ultimately come together to form a collective understanding of morality for that point in time and those within that cultural environment.
That aside, concluding that I’m “tolerant of intolerance” is both disingenuous and incorrect. I believe that culture dictates morality, and I respect that other cultures are allowed to have their beliefs, but that doesn’t mean I choose to agree with them. I don’t consider any of your examples permissible under my own moral code.
I also accept that I am not the universal standard, and that it would be hypocritical to impose my own beliefs on demographics with a different moral code. To override the moral autonomy of others1 in a crusade for moral righteousness would be an unjust act in itself. Or in layman’s idiom, “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.”
1 Others, plural. Not individuals who are exceptional to the moral concensus of their surroundings (i.e. murderers)
I believe we seek to arrive at universal morals. When we discuss atrocities, I don’t see any reason to frame concerns for the well-being of others as personal preference. Their well-being is outside myself. The concern is for their own sake, not mine. I think you’re in contradiction because you are once again saying you don’t get to override the moral autonomy of others but simultaneously concede that you oppose atrocities that the moral autonomy of others permit. If I had the option to stop another society (where the majority of that society are in agreement on the action) from engaging in arbitrary genocide of their own citizens, I’d do that. The idea that you would find my action to stop them less permissible than their own tells me you lack conviction for your own values.
Correct. I, and nobody else, should be permitted to override the moral autonomy of others. Atrocities have already been performed under the line of reasoning that the persecutors’ beliefs are objectivity superior to those that they are persecuting, and this is not something that we should aspire to repeat in the current day. Two moral wrongs—persecuting those that are persecuting others—does not make a moral right.
If the goal in your hypothetical scenario were solely to provide refuge and safe haven for willing members of said society, then I would have no problem with that. You would not be overriding moral beliefs; refugees would simply be voluntarily defecting from their own.
If your goal is to stop the genocide by destabilizing the society and installing your own set of moral beliefs in its place, then it would no longer be permissible.
Well homie I appreciate the bullet bite but I don’t know how to fix you - you not only feel no need to endorse the ending of genocide - even for the marginalized in societies outside your own, you actively discourage and look down upon interfering with genocide. I don’t know if you have the capacity to engage as a member of society, and frankly you may be a danger to it. Maybe you get the boot out of Athens 😵💫
We can agree to disagree on our differing views of morality, I guess.
With regards to genocide, it’s a tough topic. We both agree that it’s wrong, but we don’t agree on how to approach it. I come from the perspective that there isn’t a baseline for morality and that it’s amoral to foist a subjective standard on others. You come from the perspective that there exists a universal standard for morality, and that it is amoral to allow societies to deviate from it.
Two diametrically opposed viewpoints that can’t be reconciled at this point in time. Maybe, in the future, if we have a unified global “culture” and moral relativism and cultural relativism are indistinguishable, we might be able to come to some agreement. Until then, you do you, and I do me.
I’m a moral objectivist, I literally won’t do that 🤣