Hello,
Just spent a good week installing my home server. Time to pause and lookback to what I’ve setup and ask your help/suggestions as I am wondering if my below configuration is a good approach or just a useless convoluted approach.
I have a Proxmox instance with 3 VLAN:
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Management (192.168.1.x) : the one used by proxmox host and that can access all other VLANs
-
Servarr (192.168.100.x) : every arr related software + Jellyfin (all LXC). All outbound connectivity goes via VPN. Cant access any VLAN
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myCloud (192.168.200.X): WIP, but basically planning to have things like Nextcloud, Immich, Paperless etc…
The original idea was to allow external access via Cloudlfare tunnel but finally decided to switch back to Tailscale for “myCloud” access (as I am expected to share this with less than 5 accounts). So:
- myCloud now has Tailscale running on it.
- myCloud can now access Servarr VLAN
Consequently to my choice of using tailscale, I had now to use a DNS server to resolve mydomain.com:
- Servarr now has pihole as DNS server reachable across all VLAN
On the top of all that I have yet another VLAN for my raspberry Pi running Vaultwarden reachable only via my personal tailscale account.
I’m open to restart things from scratch (it’s fun), so let me know.
Also wondering if using LXCs is better than docker especially when it comes to updates and longer term maintenance.
I don’t think there is anything wildly wrong with it, but it seems like you’re doing all of this at the router, unless you have dedicated switches for each VLAN?
VLAN is not a security feature, it’s a logical separation of IP segments. Maybe I’m missing your intention here, but just setting different IP spaces on VLANs and then bridging them doesn’t help your security, it just complicates your network.
Not OP, but logical separation and firewall rules is a needed first step for security. They already mentioned in the post that one vlan has dedicated outbound (via VPN only) and doesn’t have access to their .200.
Physical switches per vlan is completely unnecessary, and entirely why vlans are used rather than subnets.
Not saying physical switches are needed for security, which is why I was asking for clarification. Doing all of this on a router doesn’t make sense without a physical separation though. That’s my point. If the router gets owned, they have access to all networks anyway. If the idea is just for traffic direction and shaping, then I’m confused why the bridged pihole.
I’m going to have to say, I have zero idea why you would suggest this for something that is logical, and specifically not physical.
Logical separations and vlan segregation for trust models is standard practice (though hopefully more will trend towards a zero trust model, but irrelevant here). There is zero need for any physical separation. What are you talking about?
Friend…you clearly are not reading what I’m saying. Not one single sentence that I’ve typed suggested there needs to be, or ever was a physical separation. That is why this setup without clarification doesn’t make much sense if security is the goal.
You are saying exactly what I’m saying and arguing about it for some reason.
Your first sentence was about physical switches…
There already is a logical separation that makes perfect sense - out through VPN with no network access initiated by that VLAN to the other two internal. That’d a security step that’s pretty clear and valid off the bat.
So again - I don’t follow anything of what you’re driving at, no. Because from the first sentence in your first comment forward isn’t making any sense.
Please, clarify, because I don’t know why you’d even bring up different switches for an extremely basic logical separation.
VLAN on a singular router without physical separation is not secure. OP was asking for feedback, that’s my feedback. It’s accurate.